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TRIPS & the pharmaceutical industry: 




The impact of global patent regulation in the form of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement has 
far reaching effects for the research based pharmaceutical industry and global public 
health This paper explores the role of accounting in reinforcing the primacy of capital 
interests over global public interest by its ability to capture and measure an abstraction - 
knowledge. This commodification of knowledge serves to transfer the responsibility of 
the global health agenda to the market. However, this market based solution is not 
sensitive to many important issues faced by governments in relation to the global 
pharmaceutical research and development agenda, such as ‘neglected diseases’. The 
terms and global nature of the TRIPS Agreement effectively constrains the ability of 
governments, particularly in least-developed countries, to address their individual public 
health issues. The adoption of TRIPS presents significant challenges and opportunities in 
an era of globalisation for both the pharmaceutical industry and policymakers.  
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The relentless march of intellectual property rights needs to be stopped 
and questioned. Developments in the new technologies are running far 
ahead of the ethical, legal, regulatory and policy frameworks needed to 
govern their use. More understanding is needed – in every country – of 
the economic and social consequences of the TRIPs Agreement (UNDP 
Human Development Report 1999) 
 
Introduction 
Innovative drug treatments have offered cures from illnesses previously considered life-
threatening, have improved lifestyles and diminished the effects of ageing on those 
fortunate enough to be able to afford treatment. In a time when international trade 
liberalisation is seen as a panacea for economic underdevelopment, The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) through the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement has constrained the ability of developing and least-developed 
countries1 to address domestic public health issues by limiting their access to affordable 
drugs. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement affords drug companies’ exclusive patent rights on 
pharmaceutical innovation for 20 years, but limits the ability of developing and least-
developed countries (LDC) to determine their national health issues (diseases) that allow 
for the import, production and marketing of low cost copies of patented medicines 
(generic drugs). Safeguards within the agreement that allow for compulsory licensing and 
parallel importing have not stopped the US Government threatening trade sanctions or 
 
1 The implications of the antimony, developing/less developing or undeveloped, is not stated but these 
terms are used in this paper as they are consistent with the literature. The TRIPS Agreement differentiates 
between developed, developing and least-developed countries in terms of their respective economies. 
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initiating WTO disputes against countries where domestic legislation has been less 
protective towards pharmaceutical companies (Oxfam, 2001). 
 
Underpinned by the ideology of neo-liberalism, incorporating free-market globalisation 
and trade-led development, the WTO through the TRIPS agreement provides a 
mechanism for companies to make monopolistic profits for a guaranteed time frame. In 
the case of the research based pharmaceutical industry, companies are granted intellectual 
property rights over certain pharmaceutical products. From an agency perspective, there 
is an expectation that the industry, in pursuit of profit, will provide social welfare 
outcomes as positive externalities through innovation. This suggests that the public 
interest in terms of global public health, can be served through market based solutions. 
The position taken by pharmaceutical companies is based on the economic rationalist 
argument of research and development cost recovery which requires support from patent 
protection. However this view, and the expensive lobbying to gain political sway by the 
pharmaceutical industry, ignores the real and present public health problems faced by 
developing and LDCs. In an era of economic globalisation, ease of technology and 
information transfer, patent protection underpins corporate profitability in a competitive 
global environment. As the economic power of global corporations increases, so to does 
their political and intellectual reach.  
 
“[T]he complex interdependencies between the economic, social, political, and rhetorical 
patterns … place accounting in a milieu of concrete, material conditions of human life 
where acts of power and acts of exclusion (victimization) are contemporaneous” 
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(Arrington, 1990, p.5). Accounting in this context is a device which serves the vested 
interests of powerful groups. In the case of pharmaceutical innovation the accounting 
discourse of costing and profitability has reoriented a means-end rationality to an ends-
mean rationality. Instead of an ex ante expectation, justification of patent protection relies 
on ex post calculations and legitimation. The quoted ’cost’ of bringing a new drug to 
market is US$802 million (DiMasi et al, 2003). “[T]he elegance of a single figure 
provides a legitimacy that, at least in certain Western societies, seems difficult to disrupt 
or disturb” (Miller, 1994, p.3). Economic justifications for patent protection using 
accounting techniques prevail. In practice, accounting techniques define, measure and 
value abstractions, identified as intangibles. In this way, accounting facilitates the 
commodification of knowledge through the ability to ‘account for’ intangible assets that 
subsequently provide a conduit or “gateway to capital” (Drahos, 1996). The perception of 
accounting as an objective neutral device subtly reinforces the dominance of capital over 
social welfare issues. The ideological hegemony of free market trade liberalisation affects 
the process of what is accounted and how, which has been demonstrated to impact on 
local communities (Cooper et al, 2003).   
 
The TRIPS Agreement highlights the tensions between the interests of various 
governments, powerful multinational corporations and the ‘public interest’, as well as the 
role of multilateral organisations in mediating these issues In order to explore these 
themes this paper is structured as follows: first we provide an overview of intellectual 
property rights and examine the interests of various dominant players and their position 
in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
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inequities presented by the adoption of the Agreement, particularly in relation to health 
issues faced by developing and LDCs.  
 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property (IP) is a property right in an abstract object. Examples include 
copyright, trademarks and patents which serve to mediate property relationships between 
individuals by objectifying an intangible. In developing a philosophical understanding of 
IP, Drahos (1996, p.1) concluded that, a “property form that allows private hands to 
capture important abstract objects creates, among other things, many person dependent 
relationships in a society. It swells the growth of private power”. 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are a distinctive form of power and the exclusive nature 
of these rights allows dominion or sovereignty over an abstraction - knowledge. This 
right should be termed and treated as a privilege and the holders of that privilege 
subsequently have duties to society (Drahos, 1996). The rationale for IPR largely rests 
with the economic argument that individuals, as self-maximisers, will only devote 
resources to the creation of abstract objects if there is a suitable incentive or reward. IPR 
allow for monopolistic pricing. This incentive has the expected outcome of generating 
creativity, knowledge and innovation. The subsequent diffusion of this knowledge is 
reliant on market based mechanisms, which may fail. 
 
Patents, as a form of intellectual property, protect inventions that satisfy the criteria of 
novelty and inventiveness for a limited duration (Drahos, 1996). Originally, patent law 
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clearly distinguished between discovery and invention. Discoveries were revealed 
knowledge compared to the creativity and originality involved in an invention. This 
dichotomy has been somewhat blurred with the rulings on patent rights in biological 
material (including genes) (Drahos, 1996). The indefinite nature of abstract objects lends 
this role of defining the criteria to interested actors and players. Accounting facilitates the 
quantification of qualitatitive characteristics. By objectifying knowledge as an intangible 
asset, it is defined in such a way that a number  represents a concept. Once defined and 
counted “differing or distinguishing attributes are no longer visible” (Robson, 1992, 
p.688). In the case of pharmaceuticals, there are two intangibles, patents and research and 
development costs (capitalised or expensed). In both cases the investment consists of 
information or knowledge generated about a drug’s safety and effectiveness rather than 
the physical properties of the compound (Kuhlik, 2004). Costing, or the ascription of 
numbers to these concepts, is used as a legitimation for the high price of on-patent drugs.   
 
In an emergent global environment dominated by multinational corporations the power 
attached to IPR is mediated through multilateral organisations, supported by governments 
with vastly differing interests. In relation to public health, the WTO’s introduction of the 
TRIPS Agreement has further highlighted issues of power, the inequities exacerbated by 
the conferral of IPR and the contested domain in which they exist. 
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WTO and TRIPs 
The WTO, the primary rule-making body for international trade, is premised on a notion 
that if developed, developing and LDC’s co-operate and equitably share in economic 
expansion, a prosperous world economy will result (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). Consistent 
with this view, the articulated primary purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is  
..to reduce distortion and impediments to trade, and taking into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade 
(Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement). 
 
The TRIPS Agreement, negotiated during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, is seen as having equal status as trade in goods covered by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the trade in services covered by the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These three agreements have been described as 
the three pillars of the WTO (Otten and Wager, 1996). These agreements are binding on 
all WTO Member States. The TRIPS Agreement aims to set minimum standards in 
intellectual property protection. The application of the Agreement requires Member 
States to modify domestic laws for consistency with the standards. 
 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection, especially in developing and LDCs, 
was perceived as inconsistent or non-existent. Where patent protection did exist, in many 
cases, the regimes varied in relation to domestically produced or imported pharmaceutical 
drugs. TRIPS has sought to overcome this issue by mandating a term of patent protection 
of 20 years, as well as requiring Member States to make patents available for domestic 
pharmaceutical inventions. Recognising the economic inequalities amongst Member 
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States, the Agreement sets out a staggered time-frame for compliance. Originally, 
developed countries were required to comply by 1996, developing countries by 2000 and 
least-developed by 2006. In 2001 at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha (Doha 
Declaration) the implementation regime was extended and some of the provisions were 
clarified. LDCs now have until 2016 to comply with TRIPS. The Doha Declaration also 
affirmed sovereign rights to protect public health. The flexibility of some of these 
provisions was codified allowing for generic drug manufacture, under special provisions, 
through the granting of compulsory licenses and parallel importing (Correa, 2002).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement reflects the changing nature of society and the increasing 
importance of technological innovation and globalisation. This ideological stance is 
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement under Article 7 through aspirational statements in the 
text such as 
 …[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
The assumption that free market globalisation and harmonisation of laws ultimately serve 
to solve social issues is problematic. As studies of globalisation have demonstrated, 
facilitating capital or information flows to stimulate economic growth does not 
necessarily result in mutual benefits between and within nations (Cooper et al, 2003). The 
public interest, as such, is not served unanimously by market based solutions relying on 
economic incentives. Nor is it served by a multilateral organisation that is anti-
democratic and prioritises corporate profits over social objectives (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). 
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Although member states appear to be equal – one nation one vote – meetings are often 
held with only a small group of members. Committees filter out interested decision 
makers and skew the outcomes in favour of the vested interests of the powerful. As with 
TRIPS, initial negotiations did not include most pharmaceutical importer nations, some 
states were misinformed and most nations were threatened by US trade power (Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2004). “TRIPS had all the transparency of a one-way mirror, with only the 
US and EC knowing exactly what was going on” (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2004, p. 29).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement has profound implications for the research based pharmaceutical 
industry, that will benefit from increased global patent protection; the manufacturers and 
consumers of generic medicines, whose future is uncertain under the TRIPS Agreement; 
and governments, who are charged with the responsibility to adopt TRIPS as well as 
meeting the economic and public health objectives of their nations. 
 
The Pharmaceutical Industry 
The research based pharmaceutical industry has frequently been criticised over a number 
of issues, especially concerning pricing and profitability (Scherer, 2001). In 2002 the 
world drug market was valued at US$406 billion, of which 20% was attributable to the 
developing world, and the proportion in LDCs much less (Commission on IPR, 2002). 
Differential pricing, bio-piracy, the nature of clinical testing and ‘evergreening’2 practices 
have all attracted less than favourable attention to the industry.  
 
2 Evergreening is the practice of making minor improvements to existing drugs and re-patenting to extend 
the advantages of monopoly pricing (Anon., 2002). 
11
The debate surrounding the global extension of IPR through TRIPS has seen the 
pharmaceutical industry emerge as one of the main lobbyists (Commission on IPR, 
2002).  The global, research based pharmaceutical industry is represented by the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), a non-
profit, non-government organisation. This association represents 60 companies (IFPMA, 
2004) and is a strong and powerful lobby group. In the US, where the majority of 
research based companies are located (see Appendix 1), PhRMA represents the leading 
research based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and is rather disparagingly 
referred to as ‘Big Pharma’ by its critics. In terms of corporate social responsibility and 
philanthropy, the industry lobby group directs these critics to the “estimated $2.7 billion 
in financial assistance and donated medicines” provided since 1998 by the major 
pharmaceutical companies (IFPMA, 2003). The issue of donated medicines is 
controversial. Research has demonstrated that these medicines are not ‘free’ and activists 
argue that it hampers country specific solutions. In the long-term, donations are neither 
sustainable solutions, nor entirely appropriate (Health Action International, 2003). 
Misuse of pharmaceuticals, whether through weak healthcare systems or overuse 
facilitates drug resistance and long-term problems in the provision of healthcare (Kremer, 
2002). 
 
The emergence of multinational corporations as dominant players in global 
pharmaceutical markets has led to standardisation and an accentuation of inequalities 
(Merson, 2000). In many cases, corporations use IPR and licensing agreements to 
disguise the structuring of a global knowledge cartel to effectively dominate markets 
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rather than being controlled by them. (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2004). The scale of 
investment required for innovation and research has resulted in the concentration and 
centralisation of research teams in the applied market (Merson, 2000).3 The 
pharmaceutical industry estimates that R&D for each new product, which includes 
product failure and opportunity costs, is US$802 million or about 30% of the total cost. 
Manufacturing costs on the other hand are relatively small. This production cost means 
that generic drugs can be manufactured and priced well below drugs under patent. The 
long time-frame of patented drugs and market exclusivity is rationalised by the need to 
cover the costs of research and development including the risk of product failure (Kettler 
& Collins, 2002).  
 
Why do developing countries object so strongly to TRIPS? Its essential flaw 
is to oblige all countries, rich and poor, to grant at least 20 years’ patent 
protection for new medicines, thereby delaying production of the inexpensive 
generic substitutes upon which developing country health services and poor 
people depend. And there is no upside: the increased profits harvested by 
international drug firms from developing-world markets will not be ploughed 
back into extra research into poor people’s diseases – a fact some companies 
will in private admit (OXFAM in Commission on IPR, 2002). 
 
The underlying assumption that strong IPR encourage innovation is the rationale for the 
implementation of the global protection offered by TRIPS. For developing nations this is 
manifested in the belief that fostering IP will encourage foreign direct investment, 
technology transfer and inputs necessary for R&D capacity (Kettler & Collins, 2002). 
This potential may be realised in the large, industrialised countries with extant 
technological and manufacturing capabilities e.g. Brazil and India. Notwithstanding the 
 
3 Of the 284 approved medicines in the nineties in the US, 93% originated from the private sector. The 
estimate of total R&D expenditure by the pharmaceutical industry exceeded US$4.5 billion in 2002 
(IFPMA, 2004) (see Appendix 2). 
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required investment, companies in these countries would also “need to move along a 
steep and rapidly evolving learning curve” (Kettler & Modi in Kettler & Collins, 2002, 
p.22). However, even given R&D potential and capabilities, research would probably be 
directed toward commercially viable products treating rapidly developing global diseases. 
 
Public Health Issues 
Global IPR in pharmaceutical products are conferred to promote improved public health 
outcomes in the short and long-term, whether through improved accessibility or trade-led 
development.  Therefore an important issue for analysis is whether the objective of global 
improved public health is being met. There is a prevailing myth in developed nations that 
research and innovation will ultimately assist poorer countries, however the health issues 
of the developing and LDCs are not necessarily paralleled with their richer cousins. For 
some diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, cancer and diabetes, the advances made in the 
developed world could assist in the developing and least-developed world. Sadly, where 
virtually unheard of treatable diseases, such as leishmaniasis and Chagas disease afflict 
thousands of people (Commission on IPR, 2002), research and innovation is minimal or 
non-existent and relies on government and private (non-pharmaceutical) philanthropy. 
This highlights the inequities in resources and opportunities for countries at different 
stages of development. 
 
In 2000 the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly with the mandate to reduce by the year 2015 the “dehumanising 
conditions of extreme poverty” (Greenhill, 2002 p.2). Part of this mandate includes 
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reducing by two-thirds the under five mortality rate, reducing by three-quarters the 
maternal mortality rate and to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Patent 
protection, especially if it involves increasing price and decreasing choice of 
pharmaceuticals, has the potential to hamper efforts to improve public health and achieve 
these goals. 
 
Some provisions of the original TRIPS Agreement exposed unintended consequences of 
a global IP regime. After lobbying by affected countries, the Doha Declaration affirmed 
sovereign rights to protect public health and acknowledged inequities by altering the 
special provisions of TRIPS relating to compulsory licensing and parallel importing. 
 
We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics (Paragraph 1, Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health)4.
Therefore,   
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health…[It] should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ 
rights to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all (Paragraph 4 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health). 
Accordingly,  
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
 
4 The original agreement restricted the scope of this paragraph to the three specified diseases. “Epidemics” 
covers any health problem including those prevalent in developed as well as developing countries (Correa, 
2002) 
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malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency (Sub-paragraph 5 ( c) Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health). 
Compulsory licenses allow for production of pharmaceuticals without the permission of 
the patent holder and can be both a short and long-term measure (Correa, 2002). 
Protection of public health through the issue of compulsory licenses is only a feasible 
option if there are the manufacturing capabilities in that country sufficient to provide 
generic drugs. There is a large disparity in the manufacturing capacities of developing 
nations and the TRIPS Agreement (Article 31(f)) originally restricted manufacturing 
under compulsory licenses to “predominately for the supply of the domestic market”. In 
August 2003 this restriction was waived allowing countries with minimal or non existent 
manufacturing capabilities to import drugs produced under compulsory license 
elsewhere. Under this  parallel importing regime, an ‘eligible importer’ may notify at any 
time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for example, only in the case 
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use (WTO, 2003).  
 
However, invoking the compulsory licensing provisions is fraught with difficulties as 
exemplified by the recent, well publicised South African experience. With an HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and prohibitive drug pricing fuelling an inability to procure patented drugs, 
alternative solutions were sought by the South African Government (Baskaran & Boden, 
2005). The response from the pharmaceutical industry was to report South Africa to the 
US Government and trade reprisals were threatened. The US also placed South Africa on 
a watch list of countries that may be contravening TRIPS. There was also a caution from 
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the UK and the European Union (Baskaran & Boden, 2005). Despite these pressures 
South Africa moved forward and imported cheap generic HIV/AIDS medicines. This 
prompted legal action by a group of 40 pharmaceutical companies supported by the South 
African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association who argued the South African 
Government were violating their patent rights by enacting a law to make medicines more 
affordable. However, pressure from global criticism and the requirement to produce 
documents relating to costs and pricing the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their 
action (Mowjee, 2003). 
Parallel importing, as a solution, relies on the existence of a market large enough for 
production to be economically viable by an eligible exporter. Manufacture of generic 
pharmaceuticals also relies on the existence of a drug to copy. Underscoring this issue is 
the impact of IP regimes in developed countries that provide a powerful incentive to 
research in the areas that affect only those in developed nations at the expense of global 
health. Consider, however, the diseases which afflict the developing world where demand 
is high but the ability to pay is low. 
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U.S & Canada 142,551.6 74.0
Latin America 4,583.7 2.4
Asia-Pacific 3,043.8 1.6
Australia & New Zealand 1,555.8 0.8
Western Europe 26,565.1 13.7
Central & Eastern Europe 1,712.1 0.9
Middle East 1,362.3 0.7
Uncategorised 4,542.7 2.4
Source: PhRMA (2004) Profile Pharmaceutical Industry 2004: Focus on Innovation. 
 
The table above clearly demonstrates the concentration in developed countries of ability 
to pay for research based pharmaceutical products. Lack of market opportunities relegate 
many diseases of the developing and least-developed nations a low commercial priority 
(Kettler & Collins, 2002). These infectious and communicable diseases are known as 
“neglected diseases” (Kettler & Collins, 2002, p.10). A study by Troiller et al (in Cohen, 
2002) of 1,393 drugs approved in the period 1975 –1999 found that just over 1% were 
specifically for tropical disease and tuberculosis. Research in neglected diseases has been 
initiated through some public private partnerships e.g. Medicines for Malaria Venture 
(MMV). Interestingly, the biggest change in funding for has come from foundations, such 
as the Gates Foundation (Cohen, 2002). Another source of R&D is the non-profit 
pharmaceutical company, One World Health, which procures dormant IP rights from 
major, for-profit pharmaceutical companies and collaborates with various NGO groups to 
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provide research and medicines. In return the pharmaceutical companies have 
philanthropic exposure and as well as a tax write-off in the US (Rogers, 2003). 
 
Recognising that the impact of IP regimes, as well as being country specific, are disease 
specific, the public health issues fall into two broad categories – those diseases 
specifically mentioned as epidemics in the Doha Declaration and those communicable 
and infectious diseases unique to developing and least-developed nations, the neglected 
diseases. 
Epidemic Diseases 
The three diseases specifically illustrative of an epidemic are HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis (TB). Interestingly these three diseases are common to the developed world 
in some form and are already on the research and development agenda. In the case of 
HIV/AIDS, it is the single biggest cause of mortality world-wide (IPR, Commission, 
2002). TB, a virtually eradicated disease in the developed world, has made a resurgence 
as a co-disease with HIV/AIDS and thus attracts research attention. Malaria, although 
uncommon in the developed world, attracts research into prophylactic treatment for 
travellers (Commission on IPR, 2002).  
 
Malaria, as an example, kills approximately 1,222,000 people annually and 88% of those 
are from Africa (WHO, 2003). Malarial control in endemic regions relies on diagnosis 
and prompt treatment, otherwise the disease advances rapidly (TDR, 2004) Although 
several drugs are available, the only treatment for many people is a medicine developed 
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in 1934, Chioroquin, and the new strains of malaria are resistant to this older treatment. 
Artemisinins, developed from traditional Chinese herbal medicines has proved an 
effective treatment, however to avoid parasitic resistance a combination therapy is 
recommended (Arrow, 2004). Although malaria is treatable using a combination of drugs, 
the lack of a viable economic market to offset the cost of newer antimalarial drugs 
prevents their use (Cohen, 2002).  
 
Neglected Diseases 
The term neglected diseases is used by health lobby groups to indicate a group of 
diseases that attract little or no research and development, and in some cases, a cessation 
of manufacture of drugs or vaccine. This term is highly emotive and the IFPMA has 
contested the use of this term based on the fact that it lacks a clear and precise definition 
for policy decisions (IFPMA, 2003). In 2001, in a joint study with WHO, the 
pharmaceutical industry identified African trypanosomiasis, leisthmaniasis and Chagas 
disease as truly neglected. These diseases are categorised as such because effective 
treatment is not available. But there is another list, those diseases which have treatments 
but for reasons of access and affordability are not available. This list includes leprosy, 
onchocerciasis, lymphatic filariasis and schistosomiasis5 (Appendix 3). Measles, a 
common disease not generally considered life threatening in developed countries, is also 
considered worthy of attention in developing countries (Médecins Sans Frontières in 
Commission on IPR, 2002).  
 
5 Acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria also fall into this category, however, 
the last three have already been discussed in the previous section. 
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The lack of availability of medicines therefore rests to some extent with market failure 
and to some extent public policy failure because of the political nature of governmental 
research agenda (MSF, 2001). The context and conditions surrounding the advent of 
disease cannot be understated, especially in terms of long term eradication. 
Leishmaniasis, an example of a neglected disease, consists of a group of fatal parasitic 
conditions related to environmental changes and degradation. The treatment, SSG, was 
developed in 1930 and requires a one month hospital stay. For many, hospitalisation for a 
month is impossible, the drug is expensive and resistance to the treatment is rising 
(Cohen, 2002). Therefore, in addition to the general health implications, the disease 
severely constrains productivity (TDR, 2004).  
 
Notwithstanding the recognition that the health issues facing the developing world are a 
combination of many factors including public policy and institutional frameworks, IPR 
hamper efforts to improve public health in the following ways, 
 
1. Research and development, unless philanthropic, is not commercially viable 
where there is a limited market in terms of ability to pay for expensive under 
patent medicines. 
2. Where drugs or the market to encourage research and development exist, such as 
for HIV/AIDS, cancer or diabetes, the drugs and vaccines are still unaffordable. 
Even generic copies may be unaffordable for patients in LDC’s. 
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3. Generic manufacturing, although providing a cheaper alternative is still market 
driven and this practice will be further constrained by compulsory licensing and 
parallel importing provisions after the full implementation of TRIPS post- 2016. 
 
Accounting and Accountability 
The commodification of knowledge serves to transfer the responsibility for health 
outcomes to the market. A global IP regime therefore, assumes global health outcomes 
will be achieved through economic globalisation. “Intellectual property rights are rule 
governed privileges that regulate the ownership and exploitation of abstract 
objects”(Drahos, 1996, p.5). In this conceptual form the privileges have the potential to 
be “liberty intruding” (Drahos, 1996, p.5) by providing dangerous levels of private 
power. When these rights are conferred on things of universal social importance and 
become object related, the holder of these rights then has the power to mediate the 
relationship between the object and the person, thus shifting the object-dependent 
relationship to a person-dependent relationship (Drahos, 1996). And this, 
 
[E]xtensive, possibly global power, will probably be concentrated in the 
hands of those who through their sufficient scientific/technological 
capabilities and superior capital resources, are able to capture, through the 
property mechanism for abstract objects, resources upon which there is a 
universal reliance (Drahos, 1996, p.161)  
 
This abstraction, intellectual property, becomes both a source of capital and a source of 
power. This power is demonstrated by the concentrated handful of pharmaceutical 
companies that through patents receive the privilege of monopolistic profits. Accounting 
is a mechanism through which power is exercised, rather than being a neutral technology 
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to provide information, (Miller, 1994). The symbolic and ritualistic aspects of accounting 
assist in justifying the agendas, methods and goals of organisations (Graham and Neu, 
2003). 
 
[A]ccounting technologies help structure the institutional field within which 
the supra-national organizations operate, influencing their goals and 
performance by shaping what is both thinkable and possible. In this way, these 
organizations serve to propagate accounting technologies, but are 
simultaneously constituted by them. …[A]ccounting and accountability 
mechanisms create a particular form of social distinction. … This social 
distinction is the asymmetry of wealth and power that exists across 
international boundaries (Graham and Neu, 2003, pp. 451-2) 
 
Patent protected monopolistic profits are presumed to be an incentive for innovation. This 
‘means-end’ rationality is reoriented by the use of accounting techniques. The ex ante 
expectation becomes an ex post legitimation for patent protection. The argument, 
reoriented in this way, effectively situates the power of defining the forum and agenda to 
the vested interests of the industry. The goal of profit maximisation gains primacy and 
drives the argument. The argument, framed in terms of economic rationalism, is in effect 
‘repackaged’ and becomes an ‘ends-means’ rationality. Accounting is not a neutral 
device and is “an attempt to intervene, to act upon individuals, entities and processes to 
transform them and to achieve specific ends…[to do so] accounting practices create the 
costs and returns whose reality actors and agents are asked to respond to” (Miller, 1994, 
p.1).  
 
Accounting defines and constructs a ‘cost’. Accounting rules prescribe the “real-ization” 
(Hines, 1988, p. 252) of this cost, which can be either expensed or capitalised and 
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subsequently amortised or written down for impairment. Accounting also provides 
organisations with the ability to ascribe a value to an abstraction, an intangible asset. The 
accounting treatment for intangible assets, whether patents or R & D, affects accounting 
profit calculation. This figure in the public domain is used as a measure of performance. 
In a controversial industry, ‘performance’ attracts attention from policy-makers and 
critics. 
 
The difficulty in directly linking profitability and pharmaceutical R & D is exacerbated 
by the complex structure of many research based pharmaceutical companies. Companies 
that comprise this industry are also involved in many other related activities, including 
veterinary products, medical supplies and nutritional products. This presents difficulties 
in isolating particular costs and products. Adding to this opacity is the practice of 
increasing R & D investments as profit opportunities expand, so supranormal profit 
opportunities dissipate. Policy interventions aimed at reducing industry profits and prices 
are subsequently preempted (Scherer, 2004).  Despite the fact that accounting treatment 
for patents and R & D varies, most western generally accepted accounting principles only 
allow capitalisation of development costs once future economic benefits are ensured6.
The International Accounting Standard IAS38 Intangible Assets7 is clear that all costs 
defined as research must be expensed.  
 
6 Under the International Accounting Standards (IAS 38), the treatment of R&D will be harmonised 
amongst countries adopting these new standards. However, the majority of the leading pharmaceutical 
companies (see Appendix 2) are domiciled in the US. The US has, as yet, made no firm commitment to 
adopt International Accounting Standards. 
7 Interestingly, the accounting regime under International  Accounting Standards will be harmonised and 
the TRIPS Agreement is a push for harmonisation of legal regimes covering intellectual property.  The 
International Accounting Standards Board is also no stranger to corporate lobbying, for example IAS 39. 
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Development costs may be capitalised if certain criteria are met. For the pharmaceutical 
industry where the development component accounts for approximately 70% of the total 
R&D budget (IFPMA, 2004) this accounting treatment is significant. These criteria 
include the ability to demonstrate the use or sale of the resulting asset and specific 
identification of future benefits including a market (Oxley, 2004). Marketing or 
regulatory approval (see below Phase IV) is considered an indication of satisfying the 
five accounting recognition criteria (Friend et al, 2004). Product development, besides 
being a large cost component, is also time-consuming. Different phases of development 
also exhibit different risk profiles in terms of expected success. The US system is the 
most rigorous and is outlined below. 
 
Table 2: Development stages required by FDA 
 
STAGE PROCESS TIME (yrs) 




Permission to test in people  
Clinical Trials   
Phase 1 Test on 20-80 normal healthy volunteers 1 
Phase II 100 -300 volunteers affected by disease 2 
Phase III 1,000 – 3,000 patients in clinics and hospitals 3 
New Drug Application 
(NDA)
2 (average) 
Phase IV Evaluate long-term effects  
Source:  Drug Discovery, Development and Approval Process8
The development process will differ between drugs and also across markets. To assess 




benefits. The contestability of this assessment is highlighted by the fact that Phase IV 
clinical trial expenditure is arguably a marketing cost (Oxley, 2004). The accounting 
treatment for purchased R&D and patents differs from internally generated research. An 
intangible asset is deemed to be created under IAS38 because the criteria for 
capitalisation is presumed to be satisfied since development risk is factored into the 
purchase price. The recent scale and number of mergers, acquisitions and collaborations 
in the research based pharmaceutical industry results in a significant accounting issue 
regarding intangible assets and subsequent amortisation or impairment (Friend et al, 
2004).  
 
Internal cost calculations for research and development are used to justify patent 
protection. These calculations are based on estimates and opportunity costs (Di Masi et 
al, 2003) and also ignore the contribution of government funded research and tax 
incentives. The shifting of marketing expenditure into the development phase further 
distorts the cost. The information used for the calculation of the average figure of 
US$802 million is not publicly available and requires many estimates compounded by the 
use of valuation techniques requiring further estimation, such as discount rates. 
Therefore, of the quoted US$802 million only half is a true cash cost (Bonduelle & 
Pisani, 2004).  Also, the sample for calculating the average cost is based on the 
development of treatments for chronic and degenerative diseases, which are more 
expensive to test (DiMasi et al, 2003).  
 
[T]his matter could be resolved simply, if the drug companies were to open 
their books and reveal their actual investments in research and development 
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(R&D). Implausibly they claim that this information would give away trade 
secrets and must remain proprietary – though when it suits their political 
agenda, they make all sorts of announcements about costs (Anon.,2002, p.5). 
 
Accounting systems provide a mechanism through which power is exercised and 
highlight issues of social welfare and distribution (Miller, 1994). R&D costs influence 
international and national resource allocation and provide inputs into public policy 
studies and decision-making (DiMasi et al, 2003). In turn, actors in the research based 
pharmaceutical industry locate their decisions and rhetoric within an accounting 
discourse. As an example, profitability studies have attempted to demonstrate that 
supranormal profits are not sustained in the pharmaceutical industry (DiMasi et al, 2003; 
Scherer, 2001). Pharmaceutical firms exploit profit opportunities by investing further in 
R&D and promotional activity to reduce returns to deflect scrutiny or policy interventions 
aimed at reducing profits or pricing (Scherer, 2001).  
 
“[Accounting] deflects attention away from contradictions and tensions that 
would otherwise translate into social conflict and change by reducing the 
matter of business ethics to cases of individual corruption. And it presents as 
universal the partisan interests of corporations, by masking the frequent 
incompatibility of social and corporate interests under a rhetorical gloss that 
allows the comfortable cohabitation of social responsibility and corporate 
profitability” (Neimark, 1995, p. 88). 
 
Financial accounting is underpinned by neo-classical economics. The notion of the 
market having the responsibility for pharmaceutical innovation rests on the assumption 
that this public good will satisfy the needs and issues of health in a global environment. 
This public good has become a private good facilitated by the TRIPS Agreement and free 
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market rationality is failing, particularly in relation to health crises in LDCs as is so often 
the case, when the economic system “pits profits against people” (Neimark, 1995, p.81). 
This is demonstrated so overwhelmingly by the case in South Africa where financial 
accounting pressures were central to the case made by drug companies (Baskaran & 
Boden, 2005; Mowjee, 2003). 
 
“The foundational assumption of classical and neo-classical economics, that 
self-interested behaviour combined with market competition will adequately 
protect the public interest, seems less and less tenable at the very moment that 
free market economics is emerging as the unchallenged international 
orthodoxy” (Neimark, 1995, p. 83). 
 
Private ownership of knowledge provides the pharmaceutical industry with the power to 
mediate relationships between R&D and health outcomes. Where this mediation role is 
conferred to a profit seeking entity, accountable to the interests of private capital, then the 
public health issues have the potential to be subverted to economic rationality. Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, the role of mediator is expanded to include global public health issues 
which are located within an economic incentive framework. Knowledge, as a public 




Pharmaceutical firm profits have frequently been in the spotlight (Meyer et al, 2000). The 
pharmaceutical industry in the US often top the Fortune 500 rankings for profitability and 
most research based pharmaceutical companies devote more revenue to profits than to 
R&D (Public Citizen, 2002). 
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The TRIPS Agreement grants the rights to monopolistic profits as an incentive for the 
creation of knowledge. As a global agreement on patented pharmaceuticals, extends the 
obligation to global welfare including improved health outcomes. The abstract notion of 
property rights is commodified through accounting discourse. Accounting plays a 
legitimating role in the economic justification for product prices, not to mention a 
rhetorical role in identifying, measuring and valuing IPR. It also plays an ideological role 
as a gateway to capital (Drahos, 1996). Accounting, because of the centrality of notions 
such as ‘costs’ in trade-resolution mechanisms, “operates as an embedded technology to 
adjudicate and apportion the spoils of such disputes” (Graham and Neu, 2003). This 
perspective, that of the primacy of capital interests, supports market based solutions to 
social problems. 
 
Inasmuch as accounting discourse and the research based pharmaceutical industry are 
unable to solve global health problems, it is clear that practitioners and policymakers 
should consider the complicity of accounting in an increasingly unjust world (Tinker and 
Gray, 2003). This consideration should involve a critique of global agreements that 
reinforce, echo and amplify the power and interests of capital providers and attempt to 
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Appendix 1: Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies 2003 
 



































































Source: Sellers, L.J (2004)  Pharm Exec 50, Pharmaceutical Executive, May. 
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Appendix 2: Top 12 Pharmaceutical Companies R&D Expenditure 2003 
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Source: Sellers, L.J (2004)  Pharm Exec 50, Pharmaceutical Executive, May. 
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Appendix 3: Burden of disease in DALY’s* by cause and mortality stratum 
in WHO regions 
 
Source:  World Health Report 2003 Annex Table 3 Burden of Disease in DALY’s  by 
cause, sex and mortality stratum in WHO regions, estimated for 2002. 
 
*DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Year ) is a summary measure of population health used 
to represent the health of a population in terms of mortality and non-fatal outcomes in a 
single figure e.g. if a person dies with a disability (weighted at 0.2) dies at age 60 (life 
expectancy =80) the burden of the disease would be 20 DALY + (60X 0.2) DALY = 32 



























35 361 8 230 902 2 876 1 653 15 729 5 948
HIV/AIDS 
 
86 072 66 772 3 220 1 600 1 620 10 834 1 965
Malaria 
 
44 716 39 165 110 2 204 19 2 755 433
African 
trypanosomiasis 
1 535 1 494 0 39 0 0 0
Leisthmaniasis 
 
2 090 383 44 248 6 1 358 50
Chagas disease 
 
667 0 662 0 0 0 0
Leprosy 
 
199 23 18 25 0 118 13
Onchocerciasis 
 
484 470 2 10 0 0 0
Lymphatic 
filariasis  
5 777 2 011 10 122 1 3 219 411
Schistosomiasis 
 
1 702 1 334 74 227 1 7 55
Measles 
 
27 058 15 567 0 2 988 257 7 060 1 170
